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The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides enhanced priority and security 
features to debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans which can be obtained from a 
lender with whom the borrower may have no past lending relationship. The 
enhanced priority of DIP financing, and the choice of a DIP lender, 
significantly impact the investment decisions made by the firm. We show DIP 
loans from an existing lender leads to a higher level of investment. We also 
show that a higher priority of DIP financing also leads to higher investment by 
the firm. A bankruptcy judge should take these incentives into account when 
approving the DIP loan.  
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Philadelphia Newspapers LLC is accusing its pre-bankruptcy lenders 
of engineering a financing pact that hijacks the publisher’s 
restructuring process and places it in the hands of the lenders . . . the 
publisher of the Philadelphia Inquirer warned that its control over 
the [c]hapter 11 proceedings could be in jeopardy if its bankruptcy 
loan of choice is not approved . . . . The terms of the prepetition 
lenders’ DIP (debtor-in-possession) loan give those lenders a veto 
power . . . . The company remains locked in a dispute with the 
lenders over two bankruptcy loan proposals currently on the table. 
Philadelphia Newspapers prefers the $15 million package offered by 
Republic First Bank, but lenders say it strips them of necessary 
protections. They argue that their $15 million financing package is 
superior. Six hours of supervised mediation on Thursday was not 
enough to bring the two parties to a consensus . . . . As a result, the 
courtroom showdown over the bankruptcy loan has been postponed 
until next Friday, when a judge will also examine the ‘‘exclusivity” 
clause currently shielding the company from rival plans.1  
—Dow Jones Institutional News, August 21, 2009  
[Referring to auto industry bailout] . . . . The government functioned 
as a debtor-in-possession, or DIP, lender. DIP lenders take equity 
positions and negotiate a reorganization plan that makes sure that 
every single creditor is made better off than they would have  
been . . . .2  
—Lawrence Summers, the director of the White 
House’s National Economic Council, Interview 
with Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2009 
INTRODUCTION 
When a firm can no longer meet its debt obligations should it be liquidated 
or should it be restructured? In a world with no frictions or asymmetric 
information the answer is straightforward: the choice that leads to preservation 
of most value is the socially optimal choice.3 However, significant uncertainty 
about the future prospects as well as conflict of interests between debt holders, 
equity holders, and operating managers can make this a difficult decision.4 A 
 
 1 Rachel Feintzeig. DJ Philadelphia Newspapers Spars With Lenders Over Loan, Plan, DOW JONES 
DAILY BANKRUPTCY REVIEW, Aug. 21, 2009. 
 2 Lawrence Summers, Lawrence Summers on the U.S. as Investor, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 
27, 2009. 
 3 How to divide the value of a firm that is unable to service its financial obligations between its various 
claim holders is an important, but separate question that we do not focus on in this paper. See generally Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (providing a 
good review of optimal bankruptcy design). 
 4 See generally id. 
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primary public policy goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (commonly 
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code or simply as the Code) is to identify 
distressed firms, where the going-concern value is higher than the liquidation 
value.5 The goal is then to protect those firms against efforts to force their 
liquidation.6 The Code provides two key mechanisms to avoid immediate 
liquidation of a firm that defaults on its debt. First is the ‘‘automatic stay”7 
provision and the second is ‘‘exclusivity period.’’8 The automatic stay (§ 362 
of the Code) ensures that a firm filing for reorganization under chapter 11 of 
the Code is protected from any civil actions (e.g., seizing collateral, collection 
of claims, creation of liens, etc.).9 The exclusivity period, provided under 
§ 1121(b), ensures that the management team of the filing firm is the only 
party allowed to propose the initial plan of reorganization (POR).10 The 
combined effect of these two provisions is that the debtor (i.e., the incumbent 
management) retains control of the assets and operations.11 Thus, after filing 
for petition under chapter 11, the debtor is referred to as ‘‘debtor-in-
possession” (DIP).12 
However, simply stopping the creditors from enforcing their collection 
claims is not enough to keep a firm operating as a going concern. A bankruptcy 
filing is likely to trigger a liquidity crisis for the firm.13 For example, most 
firms depend on credit from their suppliers to keep day-to-day operations 
running.14 Typically, few suppliers are willing to ship goods on credit to a firm 
operating under chapter 11, since their claim will not be secured, and will rank 
lowest in priority (trade credit is typically unsecured and receives the lowest 
priority under the Code).15 A chapter 11 filing would induce most suppliers to 
demand cash upfront, which can paralyze the smooth operations of the firm 
filing for chapter 11 protection.16 If the filing firm can line up a new source of 
 
 5 See H.R. Rep. No. 595, at 220 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138–39. 
 6 See id. (“The purpose of a business reorganization, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a 
business’s finances so that it may continue to provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a 
return for its shareholders.”). 
 7 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
 8 Id. § 1121(b) 
 9 See id. § 362. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See David A. Skeel Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1916–19 (2004). 
 12 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012). 
 13 See Skeel Jr., supra note 11, at 1930. 
 14 See Travis N. Turner, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look at Critical Vendor Orders and the 
Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 438–39 (2006). 
 15 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 16 See Turner, supra note 14, at 438; Matter of Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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financing (e.g., a new line of credit), it may be able to overcome such liquidity 
problems.17 Potential lenders, however, are unlikely to provide new debt to a 
borrower that has filed for bankruptcy.18 This reluctance arises from significant 
uncertainty about the repayment ability of the borrower.19 Thus, there are few 
funding options for a firm that is operating under the protection of chapter 11. 
The Code addresses this problem by providing special creditor rights to loans 
made after the chapter 11 filing.20 Specifically, § 364 of the Code allows for a 
special kind of post-petition financing, usually referred to as DIP financing.21 
The DIP lenders enjoy certain rights, which are unavailable to the creditors of 
firms not operating under chapter 11 protection.22 Historically, the U.S. 
bankruptcy law has always allowed some form of special financing for 
distressed firms (especially railroads) attempting to reorganize their 
operations.23 However, the 1978 Code went much farther in providing broader 
rights to DIP financing.24 DIP financing has become an increasingly common 
source of financing for U.S. firms filing for protection under chapter 11.25 
Dahiya et al. report that the fraction of bankrupt firms, who obtain DIP 
financing, has been rising.26 By the mid-1990s, almost half of the public firms 
filing for chapter 11 obtained DIP financing.27 Ayotte and Morrison study 
chapter 11 filings by public firms in 2001 and report that 50 percent of the 
filers obtained DIP financing and an additional 26 percent obtained permission 
to use cash under terms very similar to those of DIP loans.28 DIP financing is 
also credited with making the reorganization process more creditor friendly as 
DIP lenders have used this type of lending to exert control over the 
 
 17 See Stephen R. Dubè, Practical Management Initiatives in a Company’s Chapter 11 Preparation, 29-
7 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (2010); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 15.04[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 18 Mark L. Prager, Financing the Chapter 11 Debtor: The Lenders’ Perspective, 45 BUS. LAW. 2127, 
2127 (1990). 
 19 See Daniel V. Goodsell, Extending Post-Petition Credit to Reorganizing Debtors: Understanding the 
Tricks and Traps of Bankruptcy Code Section 364, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 93, 93 (1990). 
 20 See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 901, 901 (1993). 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id.; Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: 
Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 260 (2003). 
 23 See Skeel, Jr., supra note 11, at 1908–13. 
 24 In the late nineteenth century, financially distressed railroads, attempting reorganization, would issue 
a “receiver’s certificate,” which was a promissory note that would have the highest priority. See id. (providing 
a detailed discussion of the historical development of DIP financing). 
 25 Dahiya, supra note 22, at 260. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 511, 515 (2009). 
 28 Id. at 523. 
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reorganization process.29 For example, Bharath et al. and Adler et al. document 
significant reduction in absolute priority deviations in favor of equity holders 
in recent years.30 They argue that increased use of DIP financing is a key driver 
for their findings.31 Ayotte and Skeel propose that many features of the 
bankruptcy law, including provision for DIP financing, mitigate the liquidity 
problem of the borrower as few (if any) lenders will be willing to provide debt 
to a distressed borrower.32 The superior creditor control rights have made DIP 
financing as contract of choice for large scale restructuring involving private 
firms and government.33 For example, the U.S. Government chose to inject 
over $300 million in General Motors via a DIP line of credit.34 Similarly, to 
help with its restructuring, the city of Detroit used a $120 million DIP loan 
from Barclays bank, the first deal of its kind for a municipal bankruptcy.35 
Legal scholars, however, are not unanimous in endorsing DIP financing.36 
It is possible that DIP financing can distort a firm’s investment choices.37 
Bebchuk and Fried as well as Warren outline the drawbacks of senior and 
secured financing.38 Since DIP financing is an extreme form of senior secured 
lending, their argument against such loans is especially relevant.39 They argue 
that such credit provides strong risk-shifting incentives, specifically for 
shareholder aligned managers of a distressed firm.40 By pledging 
unencumbered assets as security, a borrower can transfer wealth from pre-
existing unsecured creditors to the new secured creditors.41 Thus, DIP 
 
 29 Barry E. Adler et al., Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11, 29 J. L. ECON. 461, 464 
(2012). 
 30 Id.; Sreedhar T. Bharath, Venky Panchapagesan & Ingrid Werner, The Changing Nature of Chapter 
11, 13 (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Working Paper No. 461, 2014). 
 31 Bharath, supra note 30, at 11–12; Adler, supra note 29, at 464. 
 32 Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Jr. Skeel, Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1557, 1604–06 (2013). 
 33 Skeel, supra note 11, at 1919–20. 
 34 Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Tr. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors 
Liquidation Co.), 552 B.R. 253, 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 35 UPDATE 2-Detroit Gets $350 mln Financing Lifeline from Barclays, REUTERS (2013), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/usa-detroit-financing/update-2-detroit-gets-350-mln-financing-lifeline-from-barclays-idUS 
L1N0I11RM20131011. 
 36 Ayotte, supra note 27, at 514–15. 
 37 Id. at 515. 
 38 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 873–74 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: 
The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1996–1997). 
 39 Robin Phelan & Ocean Tama, The Use of DIP Financing as a Mechanism to Control the U.S. 
Corporate Restructuring Process, INT’L BAR ASS’N LEGAL PRACTICE DIV., Oct. 2010, at 24. 
 40 See Bebchuk, supra note 38, at 873–74; Warren, supra note 38, at 1379. 
 41 Bebchuk, supra note 38, at 891–94. 
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financing is likely to worsen the wealth-transfer incentives of the 
management.42 Stultz and Johnson and Schwartz argue, however, that higher 
priority financing can address the under-investment problem better.43 The 
Code provides the bankruptcy judge with a wide latitude to approve an 
appropriate level of priority that a DIP loan can hold.44 Thus, it is useful to 
examine how the priority level of DIP loans affects the investment decision of 
the borrower. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework, which 
allows a bankruptcy judge to evaluate the appropriate priority level of a DIP 
loan. 
Another related issue for the bankruptcy court arises when a borrower 
requests a DIP loan from a lender who may or may not have any prior (pre-
petition) loan exposure to that borrower. The Code allows a distressed 
borrower to get its DIP financing from either its existing (pre-petition) lender, 
or from a new lender.45 There are significant benefits for a pre-petition lender 
to continue as the DIP lender. For example, an existing lender already has a 
relationship with the borrower which provides the lender an information and 
cost advantage over a new lender.46 Furthermore, by not providing DIP 
financing, the existing lender risks diluting its security on the pre-petition 
loans.47 Finally, the Code allows (although rarely) for a pre-petitioned 
unsecured lender to provide DIP financing, and the use of collateral, to secure 
both the unsecured pre-petition loan as well as the post-petition loan.48 This 
rare type of DIP financing is allowed under the cross-collateralization clause of 
the Code.49 
These arguments imply that the pre-petition lead lender is the ‘‘Natural 
DIP Lender.’’50 There are, however, competing reasons that favor a new lender 
as the sole provider of DIP financing. First, there is considerable disagreement 
among the various claimholders regarding the value of the firm, and how it 
 
 42 Cf. id. at 870–71; Warren, supra note 38, at 1374–76. 
 43 See Rene M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 512–19 
(1985); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 
425, 466–69 (1997). 
 44 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
 45 Id. § 364(d). 
 46 See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 5–6 (1994). 
 47 See PAUL ZUMBRO, DIP AND EXIT FINANCING TRENDS AND STRATEGIES IN A CHANGING MARKET 6 
(2016). 
 48 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Petersen, supra note 46, at 5–6; ZUMBRO, supra note 47, at 6–7. 
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should be divided among the various classes.51 The pre-petition lender 
(hereafter, the inside bank) enjoys substantial inside information compared to 
the trade creditor or public debtholders.52 The inside bank and the firm have 
strong incentives to collude and extract higher concessions from the 
uninformed claimholders.53 LoPucki and Whitford describe occurrences of this 
form of collusion, prior to the adoption of the absolute priority rule in 1939.54 
Bulow and Shoven and Gertner and Scharfstein discuss the coalition formation 
by the shareholders and the inside bank to achieve similar wealth transfers.55 
Berlin, John, and Saunders provide a theoretical setting, which describes a 
rational junior claimholder who anticipates the possible collusion of the inside 
bank and the firm.56 Therefore, such a creditor will be unwilling to accept the 
plan of reorganization proposed by this coalition.57 By allowing a new lender 
to provide DIP financing, a firm adds credibility to its reorganization plan.58 
Also, the under-investment problem, caused by the debt overhang, may be 
mitigated if the new lender provides DIP financing.59 
Second, Sharpe and Rajan provide another reason for turning to a new 
lender for post-petition financing.60 Both studies show theoretical models of 
the bank-borrower relationship.61 These models show that the inside bank can 
 
 51 See David T. Brown, Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy 
Law, 2 REV. FIN. STUD. 109, 109–10 (1989); Ronald M. Giammarino, The Resolution of Financial Distress, 2 
REV. FINANCIAL STUDIES 25, 27 (1989). Even among the same class (e.g., secured creditors), having multiple 
creditors can make renegotiation challenging. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Erik Berglof & Gerard Roland, 
Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2648, 
2649–51 (2010). 
 52 SANDEEP DAHIYA, KOSE JOHN, MANJU PURI & GABRIEL RAMIREZ, THE DYNAMICS OF DEBTOR-IN-
POSSESSION FINANCING: BANKRUPTCY RESOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF PRIOR LENDERS 5 (2000). 
 53 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy 
Reogranization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 132 (1990). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization 
Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1189–1222 (1991). 
 56 Mitchell Berlin, Kose John & Anthony Saunders, Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and 
Financial Distress, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 889, 892 (1996). 
 57 A number of recent news stories highlight these conflicts. For example, in the 2013 bankruptcy filing 
of GMX resources, both the unsecured creditors as well as a group of preferred shareholders filed objections to 
its $50 million DIP loan. See, e.g., Matt Chiappardi, GMX Investors Blast $50M Ch. 11 Loan as Unfair, LAW 
360 (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/436469/gmx-investors-blast-50m-ch-11-loan-as-unfair. 
 58 Darla D. Moore, How to Finance a Debtor in Possession, 6 COM. LENDING REV. 3, 8 (1990). 
 59 Stuart Gilson, Coming Through in a Crisis: How Chapter 11 and the Debt Restructuring Industry Are 
Helping to Revive the U.S. Economy, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23, 28 (2012). 
 60 Stephen A. Sharpe, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model 
of Customer Relationships, 45 J. FIN. 1069–1087 (1990); Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The 
Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367–1400 (1992). 
 61 Sharpe, supra note 60, at 1071; Rajan, supra note 60, at 1370–72. 
DAHIYA_RAY GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:53 PM 
64 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
extract monopoly rents from its borrowers, due to its information advantage.62 
This monopoly power likely plays a significant role in the period leading up to 
the chapter 11 filing, as the distressed debtor tries to renegotiate his debt.63 The 
increasing rent extraction by the inside bank can make the securing of DIP 
financing from a new lender more attractive.64 The assumption of a 
competitive market for the supply of loans implies there are many new lenders 
willing to extend DIP loans.65 In some instances, lenders use DIP financing as 
an opportunity to replace old banking relationships.66 These arguments imply 
that there are strong incentives for a firm to approach a new lender to provide 
post-petition credit.67 
Our discussion thus far, underscores the importance of priority level of DIP 
loans, and the choice of DIP lenders in shaping the investment decisions of 
borrowers. In this paper we provide a theoretical model that examines these 
issues. The two papers most closely related to our papers are Gertner and 
Scharfstein, and Triantis.68 Gertner and Scharfstein primarily focus on how 
priority and maturity structure of existing debt affects the restructuring 
outcomes.69 Our paper focuses more narrowly on the issues that arise due to 
special protection offered to DIP loans by § 364 of the Code. Triantis develops 
a theoretical model for judicial oversight of DIP financing.70 Our paper 
presents a more formal treatment of his model and provides extensions to the 
cases where a DIP loan enjoys ‘‘cross-collateralization” as well as analyzing 
the case of DIP financing being provided by an existing junior creditor. The 
financing by a junior creditor typically happens when a large trade creditor 
agrees to provide funding for restructuring. For example, Pinnacle Air, a small 
regional airline, obtained a $75 million DIP loan from Delta Airlines which 
was its largest trade creditor and customer at the time of chapter 11 filing.71 
 
 62 Sharpe, supra note 60, at 1069. 
 63 Rajan, supra note 60, at 1368. 
 64 Sharpe, supra note 60, at 1069. 
 65 ZUMBRO, supra note 47, at 15–16. 
 66 See, e.g., David Neustadt, Lending to Bankrupt Companies Seen as Opportunity to Gain Some Assets, 
AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 1987. Chemical Bank, the industry pioneer in 1990’s, used DIP financing to generate 
new lending and investment banking businesses from the firms that it previously had no relationship with. One 
of its managing directors stated, “we approach the market as a new business opportunity and typically have no 
existing exposure to the debtor.” Moore, supra note 58, at 8. 
 67 Neustadt, supra note 66; Moore, supra note 66, at 8. 
 68 Gertner, supra note 55, at 1189; Triantis, supra note 20, at 901. 
 69 Gertner, supra note 55, at 1189, 1192. 
 70 Triantis, supra note 20, at 918–19. 
 71 Pinnacle Airlines Corp., 483 B.R. 381, 389, 396 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we briefly describe the 
chapter 11 process, and discuss the various financing options available to the 
firm operating under chapter 11. This section also provides the details of §  
364 of the Code, which governs the DIP lending process. In Section 3, the 
basic model is laid out and solved for alternative bankruptcy regimes. We 
conclude in Section 4. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Chapter 11 Reorganization Process 
One of the major differences between state and federal non-bankruptcy 
debt collection laws, and the Code, is the idea of a fresh start for the debtors.72 
For a corporate borrower, this is usually achieved via a chapter 11 filing.73 As 
described by Epstein, Nickles, and White, there are various stages to a chapter 
11 case.74 A voluntary filing by the debtor marks the first stage of the 
reorganization process.75 The filing immediately results in an automatic stay on 
all payments to pre-petition creditors, all collection efforts, and all foreclosure 
actions.76 Thus, the automatic stay provides a major incentive for a distressed 
borrower to seek protection under chapter 11.77 
Simultaneously, this borrower reduces the power of pre-petition creditors, 
while allowing the incumbent management to maintain operating control of the 
debtor’s assets.78 The result is that the debtor is in possession of his own affairs 
or a ‘‘debtor-in-possession.’’79 But the protection from creditors comes at a 
cost. The debtor-in-possession (i.e., incumbent management) faces several 
restraints on how the debtor-in-possession can use the estate’s assets, and, in 
 
 72 In re Neiheisel, 32 B.R. 146, 147 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983). 
 73 The use of chapter 11 is not restricted to a business entity only; some of the lower courts barred 
individual chapter 11 filings until the Supreme Court ruled that individual debtors may file for relief under 
chapter 11. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991). 
 74 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES, AND JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY, HORNBOOK SERIES 
STUDENT EDITION, 1993. 
 75 In few cases, the commencement of chapter 11 is initiated by an involuntary petition by the creditors 
under §303. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012). 
 76 Id. § 362. 
 77 Erin Y. Baker, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: An Analysis of the Braniff Chapter 11 Proceeding, 
14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 433, 433 (1983). 
 78 While the Code allows the bankruptcy judge to replace the existing management by a court appointed 
trustee to operate the firm, in practice, the appointment of a trustee is very rare, and incumbent management 
usually continues in place, at least in the period immediately after the filing. Id. 
 79 Id. at 452–53. 
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particular, the liquid assets, such as cash.80 The various guidelines and 
restrictions on the use, sale, and lease of assets are contained in §  363 of the 
Code.81 
The debtor-in-possession plays two critical roles. First, the debtor-in-
possession formulates a plan of reorganization and, second, runs the day-to-
day business of the firm.82 Once the firm has filed for bankruptcy, the 
incumbent management continues to operate its business while formulating a 
plan of reorganization.83 At this stage the firm requires some form of 
financing, including DIP financing.84 Next, we discuss the various financing 
options available to a firm operating under chapter 11. 
B. The Post-petition Financing Process 
Let us now turn to the institutional details of the post-petition financing 
process. Table 1 shows the menu of financing choices available to a firm after 
filing for chapter 11. The first and natural source of funds for a business is the 
cash flow generated by its operations.85 This can be a substantial resource, as 
the firm is no longer paying interest on its pre-petition debt.86 Although § 363 
of the Code allows the firms to engage in the ordinary course of business 
without prior approval of the bankruptcy court, the use of cash is subject to 
extensive restraints.87 Section 363(c)(2) specifically prohibits even the ordinary 
use of ‘‘cash collateral’’ without permission from the court.88 Thus, obtaining 
court approval for the use of cash collateral provides the firm with its first 
source of liquidity.89 
 
 80 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012). 
 81 Id. 
 82 This exclusivity period is for 120 days from the date of a chapter 11 filing but is usually extended. 
Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323, 
1323, 1327, 1330 (1992). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Moore, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
 85 Kristin C. Wigness, Back to Basics: Obtaining Court Approval of DIP Financing, LAW 360 (July 17, 
2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/456314/back-to-basics-obtaining-court-approval-of-dip-financing. 
 86 Id. 
 87 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012). 
 88 Section 363(a) defines cash collateral to mean cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, 
securities, deposit accounts, and other cash equivalents. Id. § 363(a). 
 89 Sources of Liquidity and Factors Affecting Firm’s Liquidity, FINANCE TRAIN, http://financetrain.com/ 
sources-of-liquidity-and-factors-affecting-firms-liquidity/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2017). 
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The use of cash collateral may not adequately meet all the firm’s financing 
needs.90 Therefore, the firm may need to raise funds through DIP financing.91 
In most cases, the firm tries to arrange DIP credit before the formal filing of 
the chapter 11 petition.92 If the firm is able to arrange DIP financing, then the 
petition is accompanied by a request of approval for DIP financing.93 DIP 
financing can be obtained under §  364 of the Code, which has four 
subsections.94 As Table 1 describes, ‘‘§ 364 was structured with an escalating 
series of inducements that a debtor-in-possession may offer to attract credit in 
the post-petition period.’’95 Subsections (a) through (d) provide an increasing 
level of priority and security for the DIP lender.96 Section 364 is progressive in 
nature, since the benefits provided in each subsection are not available until it 
has been established that a good faith effort to obtain credit was unsuccessful.97 
DIP financing under § 364(a) is the easiest to arrange, as it does not require 
any court approval.98 It allows the debtor to obtain unsecured credit in the 
ordinary course of business.99 This credit must fund an expense that is 
otherwise eligible for treatment as an administrative expense under § 503(b), 
and enjoys the administrative expense priority.100 The restriction of credit 
under § 364(a) to the ordinary course of business means that this financing is 
usually limited to trade credit.101 
DIP financing under § 364(b) can be used for purposes other than the 
ordinary course of business, but its use must be approved by the bankruptcy 
court after a due notice and hearing.102 The lenders prefer this form of 
financing because it removes the ambiguity surrounding whether or not the 
 
 90 Chapter 11-Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 9, 2017). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Wigness, supra note 85. 
 94 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
 95 In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc., 87 B.R. 835, 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 96 Id. 
 97 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Within the class of general unsecured loans, §507(a) assigns different priorities to different types of 
unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012). Administrative expenses, as defined in §503(b), are entitled to 
first priority, among unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012). The examples of administrative claims 
include professional fees, costs of selling or liquidating assets, etc. 
 101 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
 102 Id. 
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credit is made in the ordinary course of business.103 As with the credit under 
§ 364(a), the loans under § 364(b) are unsecured.104 
Section 364(c) provides stronger incentives to the lenders. Under three 
clauses, it empowers the debtor to grant a DIP lender: 
1. priority over all other administrative expenses in the case, 
2. security interest in unencumbered assets, or 
3. a junior lien on already encumbered assets.105 
Section 364(c), like § 364(b), requires court approval after the due notice 
and hearing.106 Furthermore, the debtor must prove to the court that it could not 
obtain financing on an unsecured basis under § 364(a) and § 364(b).107 
The court can approve financing under § 364(d) if the priorities and 
security offered by § 364(c) are insufficient to obtain new credit.108 This allows 
the debtor to offer a lien on the already pledged collateral that is senior to 
existing liens, referred to as priming liens.109 The approval of such a priming 
lien is subject to several requirements. First, as in § 364(c), the debtor-in-
possession must prove that it was unable to obtain financing under § 364(a), § 
364(b), or § 364(c).110 Second, the debtor-in-possession must prove that the 
interests of the lender being primed are adequately protected.111 Finally, 
§ 364(e) protects the DIP lenders from the adverse effects of a subsequent 
reversal, or modification, on appeal of the bankruptcy court’s orders 
authorizing the super-priority and priming lien.112 
There is case law in which the pre-petition, unsecured lender agrees to 
provide DIP loans, provided that the collateral for the post-petition loan can 
also be pledged as security for the pre-petition, unsecured loans.113 This 
arrangement is called ‘‘cross-collateralization,’’ and provides additional 
incentives for a pre-petition lender to extend post-petition financing.114 
 
 103 Cf. David Epstein, Postpetition Lending Under Section 364: Issues Regarding the Gap Period and 
Financing for Prepackaged Plans, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 103 (1992). 
 104 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (2012). 
 105 Id. § 364(c). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. § 364(d)(1). 
 108 Id. § 364(d)(1)(A). 
 109 See Epstein, supra note 103. 
 110 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 111 Id. § 364(d)(1)(B). 
 112 Id. § 364(e); Epstein, supra note 103. 
 113 See In re Vanguard Diversified. Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 114 Id. 
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Whether or not it is permitted under the Code remains a controversial and 
unsettled issue.115 
Table 2 provides the priority structure of claims for a hypothetical firm that 
has contracted post-petition financing under all the subsections of § 364. 
II. THE MODEL 
The focus of this paper is to examine how DIP financing affects the 
investment incentives of a borrower. For a financially distressed firm, the legal 
recourse to the same, or higher priority, DIP financing is unique to the Code.116 
We examine how a financially distressed firm would invest if the only source 
of DIP financing is from one of its existing borrowers. Here, we focus on how 
changing the priority of the DIP loan, compared to existing pre-petition loans, 
would influence the investment decisions of the borrower. Next, we introduce 
the possibility of obtaining DIP financing from a new lender, and examine its 
impact on the investment policy of the borrower. 
Our model is similar to the one used by Gertner and Scharfstein.117 The 
model has two dates. At time 0, the only asset that the firm possesses is cash 
L  and an opportunity to invest in a project requiring total outlay of I . The 
firm has debt of face value B , due at date 0 that is held by a syndicate of 
lenders. The the firm is insolvent at date 0, i.e., LB > . The investment 
opportunity can only be exploited by the firm and cannot be sold separately. 
Thus, the firm needs LI −  to finance the investment opportunity, and it has the 
choice of arranging DIP financing from either its old lenders, or from a new 
lender. If no DIP loan can be arranged, the firm will be liquidated for L . The 
project requiring an investment of I , generates a stochastic cash flow X , 
which is distributed over [0, )∞ , with a probability distribution )(Xf . All 
parties are assumed to be risk neutral, and the risk-free rate is assumed to be 
zero.118 Thus, in case the firm has a terminal cash flow ( X ), larger than the 
 
 115 See, e.g., In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Monarch Circuit Indus., 
Inc., 41 B.R. 859 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (prohibiting cross-collateralization). 
 116 For example, the U.K. insolvency law requires that an Administrator, typically a qualified insolvency 
practitioner, replaces the board of directors as the manager of the company in administration (i.e., 
reorganization). However, in recent years some countries are amending their bankruptcy statutes to allow some 
form of senior secured lending for the reorganizing firm. For example, in 2009 Canada amended its 
Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) to codify the circumstances in which courts will allow DIP 
loans. See Epstein, supra note 103. 
 117 See Gertner, supra note 55. 
 118 While assumption of zero risk free rate is not realistic, it allows us to abstract away from determining 
the interest rate and, instead, allows us to focus on the effect that priority has on the investment incentives of 
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face value of the total debt ( B ), the residual surplus is retained by the coalition 
of DIP lender and the shareholders of the firm. This surplus can be shared 
between the borrower and lender, although we do not model the sharing 
contract. To keep model tractable, we make the same assumption as Gertner 
and Scharfstein and assign the entire surplus to the DIP lender.119 
We define the first best investment policy (socially optimal) for the firm as 
one that increases the total value of the firm. Let NPV *  (Socially Optimal) 
denote the minimum level of expected NPV of a project, such that the project 
would increase the value of the firm. It is easy to see that (NPV) * timalSociallyOp  =0, 
i.e., all positive NPV projects should be undertaken. Thus, every project 
requiring an investment I  that has an expected return, X  greater than I , 
should be undertaken. In the next section, we examine how the presence of 
pre-existing risky debt, and the priority of DIP loans, affects the investment 
policy. 
A. DIP Financing Provided by Pre-petition (Old) Lender 
We shall first restrict our analysis where one of the firm’s existing lenders, 
which we refer to as ‘‘Old or Pre-petition Lender,’’ provides DIP loans. 
Additionally, we focus on the impact of different priority levels of DIP loans 
on the investment incentives of the borrower. 
1. The Pre-petition Bank Provides Financing at the Same Priority as Pre-
petition Loans 
Assume that the bank provides the DIP loan and has a fraction ϕ  of the 
pre-petition loan. Thus, the face value of its existing debt is Bϕ . If the firm 
does not get DIP financing, it will be liquidated. In that case, the potential DIP 
lender with fraction ϕ  of the old loan would realize a cash flow equal to Lϕ . 










    (1) 
Where )(= LIBZ −+  denotes the total face value of debt (DIP loan and 
pre-petition ) at time 1. Equation 1 is the incentive compatibility constraint for 
the old lender willing to provide a DIP loan. The first term is the pay-off to the 
 
the firm. Gertner and Scharfstein also make this assumption in analyzing the effect of the reorganization law 
on workouts. See id. 
 119 See id. 
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DIP lender when the firm’s cash flow is not sufficient to cover the entire debt 
repayments. The second term is the pay-off to DIP lender when the cash flow 
is adequate to pay off the debt, and the DIP lender takes the residual value.120 







ϕ−−−+  . Also the second term can be 
expanded and rewritten as dXXBfdXXXf
ZZ
)()(1)( ϕ−− 
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+                                                    (3) 
Conceptually EBV  is the value of existing debt conditional on the firm 
obtaining a DIP loan regardless of who provides the financing. Substituting the 
value of EBV  in Equation 2, it can be rewritten as: 
.)(=])[(1> * ityEqualPrior
E
B NPVLVIX −−− ϕ                                        (4) 
The expected NPV of undertaking the investment is IX − . Thus, the right 
hand side of the inequality in Equation 4 is the minimum expected NPV of the 
project, for which an old lender would provide DIP financing at a priority level 
equal to that of pre-petition loans. If ][ LV EB −  is equal to zero, then we obtain 
the socially optimal outcome: all projects with positive NPV are financed. This 
is the case if the decision to obtain DIP financing makes the value of existing 
debt exactly equal to the pay-off if the firm is liquidated. This implies that 
there is no wealth transfer to or from existing debt holders arising from the 
decision to invest in the project financed by new DIP loan. This socially 
optimal outcome can also occur if the pre-petition lender is the only existing 
lender, i.e., 1=ϕ . In this case, the investment problem is trivial, since old 
lenders would always finance only positive NPV projects. If ][ LV EB −  is not 
equal to zero, however, then the firm’s investment policy will deviate from the 
 
 120 For simplicity, we assume that entire surplus is paid to the DIP lender. This assumption can be 
relaxed to allow sharing of the surplus between the DIP lender and shareholders, but would add complexity 
without any additional insights on how priority of DIP loan affects the investment choice. 
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socially optimal. If <][ LV EB −  0, the right hand side of Equation 4 will be 
negative. Thus, the firm will invest in some projects that are negative NPV 
implying over-investment. On the other hand, if >][ LV EB −  0, the minimum 
cut-off point above which the firm will invest is strictly greater than zero. This 
implies that the firm will forego some positive NPV projects resulting in 
under-investment. 
2. The Pre-petition Bank Provides DIP Financing at a Priority Higher to 
Pre-petition Loans 
If the DIP lender is able to get higher priority, then the incentive 














∞                                      (5) 
The first term in Equation 5 is the pay-off to the DIP lender if cash flow is 
less than the face value of the DIP loan ( LI − ). The second and third terms 
describe the pay-offs to DIP lenders at increasing levels of realized cash flows. 
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+−−                                   (7) 
Conceptually, HBV  is the value of an existing loan conditional on a firm 
obtaining a new DIP loan (regardless of who provides this loan) at a higher 
priority compared to existing loan. Substituting HBV  in Equation 6 yields: 
.)(=])[(1> * rityHigherPrio
H
B NPVLVIX −−− ϕ                                           (8) 
Denoting ])[(1 LV HB −−ϕ  by (NPV) * rityHigherPrio , Equation 8 describes the 
minimum level of expected NPV from a project for which the pre-petition 
lender would provide DIP loans. The higher priority of DIP loan would 
induce the lender to finance a larger set of projects, since the minimum 
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acceptable NPV is lower for a lender, who gets higher priority for his DIP 
loan as summarized in the following lemma: 
Lemma 1 (L:L1) *)( ityEqualPriorNPV  is strictly greater than *)( rityHigherPrioNPV . 
This implies that the cut-off level for NPV below which the project will not 
be financed is lower if the DIP loan is at at a higher priority compared to 
the existing loans. Thus, a higher priority of a DIP loan results in a higher 
level of investment.  
Intuitively, the increased willingness to invest, due to a higher priority of a 
DIP loan, addresses the well-known problem of ‘‘debt overhang’’ as discussed 
in Myers.121 Thus, for firms that have an attractive set of investment projects, 
but face a large debt overhang, access to a higher priority DIP loan would lead 
to more efficient investment. However, the higher priority may not be an 
optimal outcome for all borrowers. For borrowers with poor investment 
opportunities, higher investment may lead to inefficient risk-shifting in 
negative NPV projects.122 For such borrowers, DIP financing should be 
provided (if at all) at equal priority.123 We summarize this intuition in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1 (P:OldPriority)  
DIP financing at higher priority should only be granted for the 
borrowers that have good investment opportunities.124 
3. Cross-collateralization 
Cross-collateralization is a controversial feature of the Code, under 
which the bankruptcy judge can allow the old lender, providing DIP 
financing, to have higher priority for both the DIP financing and its 
proportion of the old loan.125 In some cases, the pre-petition lender can 
‘‘roll-up’’ its old loans into the new DIP loan, effectively using part of the 
 
 121 Stewart Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 147–75 (1977). 
 122 Michael C. Jensen, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Cross-collateralization has been defined by the Second Circuit as follows: “In return for making new 
loans to a debtor-in-possession under [chapter 11], a financing institution obtains a security interest on all 
assets of the debtor, both those existing at the date of the order, and those created in the course of the [chapter 
11] proceeding.” This is not only for the new loans (the propriety of which is not contested), but also for 
existing indebtedness to it. Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Com. Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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DIP loan to retire the old loan.126 Conceptually, a roll-up facility is similar 
to a cross-collateralized DIP loan.127 We examine the investment incentives 
if the DIP loan is cross-collateralized as highest priority. 
The face value of total loans extended by a pre-petition DIP lender would 
equal LIB −+ϕ , which can be rewritten as TBZ =)(1 ϕ−− . In order for the 
DIP lender to be willing to provide financing that is cross-collateralized, the 










   (9) 
The first term of Equation 9 reflects the cross-collaterlization, since both 
the pre-petition loan exposure of the DIP lender as well as the new DIP loans 
enjoy first priority. Note that the fraction of pre-petition loan owned by 
lender(s) not providing the DIP loan is effectively subordinated. Rearranging 
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Let us define 
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Substituting CBV  in Equation 10 we get: 
].)[(1> LVIX CB −−− ϕ                                                             (12) 
Thus ])[(1 LV
C
B −−ϕ  is the minimum level of expected NPV for a project 
that would be financed by a cross-collateralized DIP loan. We denote this by 
*NPV  (cross-collateral). Effectively, cross-collaterlization is an even higher 
level of priority, compared to the case where only the DIP loan had higher 
priority. This can be summarized in the following proposition: 
  
 
 126 In re Capmark Fin. Group Inc., 438 B.R. 471, (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 1, 2010). 
 127 In re Coda Holdings, Inc., (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 6, 2017). 
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Proposition 2 (P:Cross)  
For borrowers that have an attractive investment opportunity set, DIP 
financing can be cross-collateralized with the pre-petition debt. Conversely, for 
borrowers with a poor investment opportunity, set DIP financing should not be 
cross-collateralized.  
Again, the result is expected due to an increase on the priority of the loan, 
which makes the lender willing to finance a larger set of projects. 
So far, we have examined how the priority of a DIP loan affects the 
investment decisions of the firm. However, we restricted the firm’s choice 
of DIP lender to one of its existing pre-petition lenders. In the next section, 
we examine what happens when the firm raises DIP loans from a new 
lender. This new loan, the so called ‘‘pure debtor-in-possession financing,’’ 
happens when a lender with no pre-petition relationship to the firm agrees 
to provide DIP financing.128 
4. New DIP Lender is Allowed 
In this section, we show that for same level of priority, the minimum level 
of expected NPV, required to induce a new DIP lender to lend, is always 
higher than the minimum NPV required by a DIP lender, who also holds some 
pre-petition debt. This situation is captured in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3 (P:NewLender1) 
For the same level of priority, the minimum acceptable NPV for a project 
required by a new DIP lender is higher than the one required by the loan 
provided by a pre-petition lender. 
The intuition here is that new DIP lender must break even on the DIP loan 
only as it has no outstanding debt. An existing borrower will be willing to 
finance a project with somewhat lower NPV as long it leads to some increase 
in value of existing loan. Thus, the existing lender may be willing to invest, 
even if the DIP loan does not break even on a stand-alone basis, as long as the 
old loan recovery level is high enough. 
 
 128 See In re Gen. Growth Prop., Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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5. Same Priority DIP Financing from an Existing Lender vs. Higher 
Priority DIP Financing from a New Lender 
Another interesting issue is when a bankruptcy judge is presented with 
competing offers from an existing lender, who is willing to provide DIP loans 
at equal priority, and a new lender, who is willing to provide DIP financing at a 
higher priority. While at first glance it may appear unfair to grant the new 
lender higher priority, the investment decision would in fact depend on how 
large a fraction of the pre-petition loan (i.e., ϕ ) is owned by the existing 
lender, who willingly provides DIP financing. This situation is formalized in 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 (P:NewLender2)  
DIP financing, from an existing lender at the same priority, would still 
lead to more investment than DIP financing at a higher priority from a new 











This proposition captures the idea that if the old lender holds a large 
enough fraction of existing debt, the ability to increase the value of this 
outstanding debt is strong enough to induce the lender to provide DIP 
financing at the same priority and achieve similar investment incentives, which 
a new DIP lender will achieve only if granted higher priority. 
B. DIP Financing from the Pre-petition Senior Lender vs. the Pre-petition 
Junior Lender 
So far, we have considered a firm with only one class of pre-petition 
debt. In this section we examine what happens if the firm has two different 
classes of pre-petition debt and the DIP financing can be provided by either 
of them. While the basic framework of our model remains the same, the 
firm now has senior debt of face value B  and junior debt of face value J . 
We assume that that there are only two pre-petition lenders with one 
holding the senior debt and the other holding the junior debt. We also 
assume that the liquidation value L  of the firm is lower than B , so that 
both classes of creditors would lose part of the face value in case the firm is 
liquidated. The DIP financing is assumed to be at the same level as the 
DAHIYA_RAY GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:53 PM 
2017] EVALUATING DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING 77 
senior debt.129 If the senior creditor provides the DIP financing, the 
following condition must be satisfied: 
 















∞++−−−  (13) 
where BLIZ +−=1  and JBLIZ ++−=2 . 
The junior creditor would be willing to provide DIP financing if: 












Z −+−  ∞     (14) 
The right-hand side of Equation 13 gives the lowest NPV project that the 
firm with DIP financing from it senior creditors would be able to finance. 
Similarly the right-hand side of Equation 14 gives the lowest NPV project for 
the firm with DIP financing from its junior creditor. 
To examine the investment policy of the firm with DIP financing from 
different class of pre-petition lenders we compare 1k  and 2k . If 0<12 kk − , the 
financing from junior creditor will lead to greater investment as the minimum 
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Z −−+−−++−  ∞            (16) 
It is difficult to get sharp predictions on the investment policy of the firm 
from Equation 16. We restrict our analysis to the special case in which X  is 
distributed uniformly over an interval ][0,M , where 2> ZM .130 We further 
 
 129 We also consider the case where the DIP financing is provided at a priority higher than the senior 
pre-petition debt. The results remain qualitatively the same and are not reported. 
 130 Distributions with more support in respective tails have not been considered and are left for future 
work. 
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assume that IM 2> , this implies that the firm invests only in positive NPV 
projects. 
Let the total indebtedness of the firm be denoted by JBT += . Thus, 
the combination of senior and junior debt can be denoted by ),( TBB − . 
The following proposition describes the effect of the mix of total debt T  
on the investment incentives of the firm: 
Proposition 5 (P:5) For any given level of total debt T , and for every 
level of senior debt B , there exists a unique level of liquidation )(* BLT  such 
that: 
1. If the liquidation value of the firm )(> * BLL T , financing from 
the junior pre-petition lender would lead to higher levels of investment 
0)<( 12 kk − , 
2. If the liquidation value of the firm )(< * BLL T , financing from the 
senior pre-petition lender would lead to higher levels of investment 































BLT                                  (17) 
CONCLUSION 
The Code provides unusual incentives to potential lenders to provide credit 
to firms reorganizing under chapter 11. These include higher priority and 
enhanced security for the loans commonly referred to as DIP financing.131 
Furthermore, either the existing lenders, or a new lender, can provide the DIP 
financing.132 A major requirement for DIP loans is the approval from the 
bankruptcy court.133 This article focuses on the implications of allowing 
different priority levels of DIP loans, as well as the effect of allowing pre-
petition versus new DIP lender to provide DIP loans. 
 
 131 See John D. Ayer et al., Obtaining Dip Financing and Using Cash Collateral, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 16 (2004). 
 132 See id. 
 133 See id. 
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Our main result is that a higher level of priority for DIP loans would 
provide incentives to invest a larger amount. This outcome would be desirable 
for firms with attractive investment opportunities but with large debt overhang. 
Thus, for firms faced with an ‘‘under-investment’’ problem, a bankruptcy 
judge should allow a high priority level for the DIP financing. The increased 
investment may not be optimal for firms that do not have many good 
investment opportunities. In this case, the high priority DIP financing can lead 
to dissipative investment in high risk, negative NPV projects. 
A bankruptcy judge should keep this risk-shifting incentive in mind when 
approving DIP financing and should scrutinize the higher priority DIP 
financing proposals more closely. Cross-collaterlization is shown to be an 
extreme form of high priority DIP financing and, as such, should be allowed 
only when there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the firm possesses 
good investment opportunities. In choosing between an existing or new lender 
to provide DIP financing, the bankruptcy judge would need to ascertain the 
desirability of higher investments because, for any given level of priority, DIP 
loans from existing lenders are likely to induce more investments. Thus, for 
firms faced with the ‘‘under-investment’’ problem, DIP loans from existing 
lenders would be optimal. For firms that are prone to risk-shifting, the higher 
profitability requirement of a new DIP lender would provide better monitoring. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Equations 4 and 8 describe the minimum acceptable NPV for equal priority 
and higher priority DIP loans respectively. To prove Lemma 1, we need to 
show >HB
E




B =− . 
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Since ZLI <)( −  and ZX <  over the interval ),( ZLI −  it follows that 
0>K . 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Follows immediately from Lemma 1, as higher priority always leads to 
greater investment. This higher investment is only optimal provided the 
borrower has enough good, positive NPV projects. 
The result is intuitively appealing, as the higher priority on the DIP loan 
should induce the lender to finance a larger set of investment projects. Simple 
numerical examples illustrate the investment decisions made by the firm. 
Case 1: Liquidation value is low but investment opportunities are good 
( LVV HB
E
B >> ) 
Consider a firm with pre-petition debt of face value B equal to 100, held by 
two lenders that equally share (ϕ  = 0.5). The firm has a liquidation value L 
equal to 80. One of the existing pre-petition lenders provides the DIP 
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financing. Further, let 90=HBV  and 110=
E
BV .134 If the DIP loan is at the same 
priority as the pre-petition loan, then the lowest level of NPV, for which a DIP 
lender would be willing to lend, can be estimated using Equation 4: 
(0.5)(110-80)=15. 
In this case, the firm would forego all projects with expected NPV between 
0 and 15. Though, if the same firm were to obtain its DIP financing at a higher 
priority, then the cut-off level of NPV, above which the DIP lender would be 
willing to finance, is (using Equation 8): 
(0.5)(90-80)=5. 
Thus, the firm with higher priority DIP financing invests more than the 
firm with equal priority DIP financing. For a firm that has investment projects 
that are mostly positive NPV, higher priority of DIP financing is more likely to 
induce value increasing investments. 
Case 2: Liquidation value as well as investment opportunities are 
mediocre ( HB
E
B VLV >> ) 
Again, using the example described above, let us consider a firm for which 
70=EBV , 60=L , and 50=
H
BV . If the firm receives a DIP loan with equal 
level priority to its pre-petition loans, it undertakes all projects with a NPV 
equal to: 
(0.5)(70-60)=5. 
While the cut off NPV project for a firm with a higher priority DIP loan is: 
(0.5)(50-60)=-5. 
The higher priority DIP financing results in the firm investing in negative 
NPV projects. In this case, equal priority of DIP loans results in better 
investment incentives. 
Case 3: Liquidation value is high and investment opportunities are 
poor ( HB
E
B VVL >> ) 
Again, using the example described above, let us consider a firm for which 
50=L , 40=EBV , and 30=
H
BV . If the firm receives a DIP loan with equal 
 
 134 The value of HBV  and 
E
BV  would also depend on distribution )(Xf  of cash flows as well as the 
liquidation value L . 
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level priority to its pre-petition loans, it undertakes all projects with NPV equal 
to: 
(0.5)(40-50)=-5. 
While the cut off NPV project for a firm with a higher priority DIP loan is: 
(0.5)(30-50)=-10. 
Here the optimal decision is to liquidate the firm. If, on the other hand, DIP 
financing were to happen, equal priority would cause less value destruction.  
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Proposition 2 implies that cross-collaterlization would lead to even higher 
investment than a higher priority of DIP loan, i.e., minimum level of NPV 
required by a lender with a cross-collaterlized DIP loan is even lower than the 
cut-off NPV required by high-priority DIP lender. Thus, we need to show that 
>CB
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Since Z  is always greater than X  for ZXLIB <<)( −+ϕ , and 0>S  for 
)(<<)( LIBXLI −+− ϕ , the right-hand side of Equation A-4 is always 
positive. Thus, >CB
H
B VV −  0.  
Proof of Proposition 3: 
We need to show that the minimum acceptable NPV, for a project to be 
acceptable to a new DIP lender, is higher than the one required by an existing 
lender. We derive this for the case when both the old and the new lender 
provide DIP loans at equal priority, and then, we derive the same result for 
higher priority DIP loans. 
Case 1: The new lender provides financing at the same priority as the 
pre-petition lender 
We first consider the case in which the DIP financing is provided by a new 
lender and at the same priority as the old loans. The incentive compatibility 





















LVIX EB −− >                                                                                     (5) 
E
BV  is as defined before in Equation 3. 
Equation A-5 allows us to compare the investment policy of the firm, 
which obtained DIP financing from an existing lender, to the investment policy 
of the firm that obtained DIP from a new lender. The cut-off level of NPV for a 
project is (1-ϕ ) ][ LV EB −  for the firm with the DIP loan from its pre-petition 
lender (Equation 4). The lowest level of NPV project that is financed by a new 
DIP lender is ][ LV EB −  (Equation A-5). Since 1 0  ≤≤ ϕ , the proof follows 
immediately. 
Case 2: The new lender provides financing at the higher priority than 
the pre-petition loans. 
In this case, a new lender provides the DIP financing, and the DIP 
financing carries higher priority than the old loans. 
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.> LVIX HB −−                                                                                   (6) 
H
BV  is as defined in Equation 7. 
Equation A-6 allows us to compare the investment policy of the firm, 
which obtained higher priority DIP financing from an existing lender, to the 
investment policy of the firm that obtained higher priority DIP financing from 
a new lender. The cut-off level NPV for a project is (1-ϕ ) ][ LV HB −  for the 
firm with the DIP loan from its pre-petition lender (Equation 8). The lowest 
level of NPV project, financed by a new DIP lender, is ][ LV HB −  (Equation 7). 
Since 1 0  ≤≤ ϕ , the proof follows immediately. The discussion of two cases 
shows that if the priority level of DIP loan by existing lender or new lender is 
assumed to be the same, the DIP financing by its existing pre-petition lender 
leads to a higher level of investment. In other words, the minimum acceptable 
NPV of a project is higher for a new DIP lender than the cut-off required by a 
DIP lender who already has loans outstanding. The intuition behind this is the 
fact that the new DIP lender receives the pay-off only from his DIP loan, while 
a pre-petition lender can achieve some additional pay-off if the value of the old 
loan increases. Again, for borrowers who face severe debt-overhang, but have 
good investment opportunities, allowing an existing lender to provide DIP 
financing would address the under-investment problem more effectively. If the 
borrower does not have many good investment projects though, the higher 
threshold required by a new DIP lender results in better investments.  
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Equation 4 provides the cut-off level of NPV required by an old lender 
willing to lend at equal priority, while Equation A-6 describes the same for a 
new DIP lender willing to lend at higher priority. The investment level would 
be higher for DIP loans from old lenders only if: 
];[<])[(1 LVLV HB
E
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Again, the desirability of higher investment depends on the set of 
investment opportunities that the borrower has. If the firm needs to be provided 
with higher investment incentives, an equal priority DIP loan from an existing 
lender would achieve this outcome as long as the existing lender has a 
sufficiently large outstanding loan.  
Proof of Proposition 5: 
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that if the firm has high liquidation 
value the senior creditors would suffer relatively smaller losses in case of 
liquidation and thus would only finance projects with relatively higher NPV. 
On the other hand, the junior debt-holders have little to gain from the 
liquidation and would finance a larger set of projects. However, if the firm has 
a very low liquidation value then the senior lenders would have incentives to 
lend as the investment would offer some probability of recovering their 
outstanding debt. 
By assumption X :  Unif ][0,M  hence Mxf 1/=)( . 








Z −−−++−+−  )()(2)()(= 212
1
1
012               (8) 











BT Z                                                         (9) 
],[)(=)()(= 222 ZMM
JBdxxfJBT MZ −
















−−−−+−−+       (11) 
The Equation 8 can be rewritten as: 
















 −−                             (12) 
If 0<12 kk − , we know that the firm will invest in a larger set of projects if 
the DIP financing is provided by the junior creditor. If 0=12 kk − , the 
investment decisions are unaffected by the choice of DIP lender. If 0>12 kk − , 
the investment is higher if DIP financing is from the senior creditor. 
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Further, 12 kk −  is a decreasing function of L  as shown below in Equation 
15. Note that the right-hand side of Equation 15 is always negative under the 









kk                                                        (15) 
It follows thus if L  is below the critical liquidation value ( 0>12 kk − ) 
then the DIP financing by the senior creditor leads to greater investment. On 
the other hand, if L  is above the critical liquidation value( 0<12 kk − ) then the 
DIP financing by the junior creditor leads to higher investment.  
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Table 1 
The Hierarchy of Financing Options for a Firm Operating Under Chapter 11 
 
Relevant 
Section of the 
Bankruptcy 
Code 
Features of the 
Financing 
Arrangement 
Security and Priority of
the Post-petition debt 
Legal 
Requirements 
§ 363(c)(2) Use of Cash 
Collateral 
Not Applicable Approval of the 
bankruptcy court 
§ 364(a) Debt incurred in 




No court approval 
required 
§ 364(b) Debt incurred for 
purposes other 
than ordinary 
course of business 
Unsecured, Administrative 
Priority 











 Debtor has to show 
that it could not get 
financing under 
Sections 364(a) or 
364(b) 
§ 364(c)(1)  Unsecured, Senior 
Administrative Priority 
 









§ 364(d) Primed Debt Secured by a senior or 
equal lien on assets 
already subject to lien or 
pledge 
Same as Section 
34(c) and show 
that existing 






Collateral securing the 
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Table 2 
Priorities of Major Creditor Classes for a Chapter 11 Firm 
 
Priority Rank  Claim and Relevant Priority Section
 The primed lien DIP loans under § 364 (d).  
 Secured claim holders (up to the value of collateral) under 
§ 506 (a).  
 Super-priority claims of the DIP lender under § 364 (c).  
 Administrative claims under § 507 (a) (1), § 503 (b), § 364 
(a) and § 364 (b).  
 Involuntary gap creditor claims under § 507 (a) (2) and 
§ 502 (f).  
 Unsecured claims (including the shortfall of collateral for 
secured claims) § 506 (a).  
 
